Modern Warfare

[Devereaux]

Consider what all has to go into a tank to do the job it does. It’s a bit like a revolving home - connections! So if the mag is in the same flat plane area of the older Soviet designs, you have to come up with other ways to route the C&C functions, gun control, aim, shoot ability functions. None of those would be easy with a circular turret holding ammo. And IIRC, the whole 360 degrees around the bottom of the turret is an ammo locker.

We have all seen and love the pics of Israelis destroying Soviet tanks with one missile - rather spectacularly. Tended to cook-off the ammo and the whole turret went upwards. The ammo bunker on any tank is a rather sensitive area, so I would expect the Soviets to have up-armored the bunker. But that might make their other function controls more susceptible to enemy fire. Recollect Bradley’s only have the 25mm chain gun. They have TOW’s but those weren’t used in this engagement it seems. Your point about killing everyone with a turret hit is - maybe. A HEAT round makes a small hole in the armor and the molten metal from the shot sprays aroound the tank. Kind of like a small bomb. BUT the shrapnel has a vector, so the potential damage to crew can vary. HEP-T ammo figuratively splats onto the outside of the armor, then detonates and that causes the inner layer top spray around. BUT no hole in the tank. So probably more like dropping a grenade into an open cupola, though calibre of the firing gun does make a difference. Reactive armor does tend to prevent that. Even back in WWII days, tank crews were putting up barriers around the tank, intended to cause the detonator of a HEAT round to fire away from the direct side of the tank, thus minimizing the damage, since it was basically done by geometric concentration of the blast and detonating the shell outside of the optimum distance from the side of the armor tended to cause a non-damaging hit.

And to Gavin’s point, someone long ago said “quantity has it’s own quality.” It certainly was the basis of many Norko and Jap charges. We just got good at killing a LOT of people when we needed to.

[jdougan]

Prior to the most recent generations of tanks, almost everyone stored at least some rounds unprotected in the turret. The propellant in those rounds will probably cook off in the case of a turret penetration and make the tank a contestant in the 10m turret toss event. Russian tanks have more rounds near the turret so the turret will go higher, but the crew is just as dead in all of them.

M1 Abrams have an easy to access ammo bin with interior blastproof automatic doors (and external blow out panels) that the loader operates with a foot pedal, making a much smaller vulnerability window. The Leopard 2, as you would expect from its origins in the same bi-national MBT-70 program as the M1, has a similar ammo compartmentalization scheme in the turret. The French Le Clerc tank uses belt fed autoloader and manages cooking off with a different arrangement of blow out panels. The Challenger 2 is a bit different, due to its use of multi-part rounds (projectile, combustible charge, vent tube igniter) with a rifled gun but the sensitive powder bags have some storage protection.

The last Russian tank to not use an autoloader is the T-62, but it has an unprotected 4 round ready rack in the turret. The T-64, T-72, T-80 and T-90 have essentially the same 125mm autoloader gun. Ammo storage is mostly below the turret ring, but that apparently doesn’t help help if a fire starts or you are hit from the top. Theoretically the Russian T-14 is going to manage the problem by keeping an armoured 3 man crew compartment forward and separate from an even more automated turret, but there are some questions regarding the Russian’s ability to take the tank into production and subsequent mechanical reliability.

If you look closely, you’ll see a lot of other doctrinal and design differences between Russian and Western/NATO armoured vehices. In the European War That Thankfully Wasn’t, NATO’s conventional stance was primarily defensive, relying on defence in depth, and there was less available manpower. So they started to prioritize things like taller tanks with lots of available gun depression (for defensive enfilades), crew survivability, a faster reverse gear, and better information processing and sensors.

The Soviets and later Russians, have a different doctrine, deep battle, which is strongly oriented around mass and “The best defense is a good offence”[1]. So the tanks have a lower profile, tend to weigh less, have smaller crews, and can be mass produced with varying levels of technology and quality depending on the intended user. As the Soviets saw it at the time, the autoloader wasn’t much more hazardous than existing practice, and let them potentially field a third more tanks and make those tanks smaller and harder to hit. They were also less concerned with losses, particularly amongst the non-Russian Pact members. (Fighting NATO to the last Pole!)

Finding this stuff for most tanks is surprisingly hard. Not as sexy as armour thickness and gun size.

[1] See the descriptions for the 1974 Seven Days to The River Rhine and Revealed: How the Warsaw Pact Planned to Win World War Three in Europe

[Devereaux]

I was never a tanker. Being basically a grunt, I did not like having tanks around; they were bullet magnets. Every RPG in the province would be aimed at the tank. What I know is from reading - both published stuff as well as classified docs. The latter were interesting because I spent the latter part of my military time in an Air Guard unit, so planning for a possible Warsaw Pact invasion via the Fulda Gap was a part of what we did.

There is a lot of information about Soviet armor via the IDF and their analysis of arab captured or destroyed armor. I am sure after Dessert Storm, when we gave the Saudi’s a bunch of our stuff, the Russians now know much about our gear. (Plus what was “left” in Afghanistan). These sources aren’t necessarily easy to run down, but they’re out there.

I do want to thank you for the fairly detailed post. While I knew some of the facts you mention, some were new to me.

[jdougan]

@Devereaux

Being basically a grunt, I did not like having tanks around; they were bullet magnets. Every RPG in the province would be aimed at the tank.

Indeed. A moving foxhole does attract the eye.

I’ve just seen a lot of off-base criticism and comparisons between Soviet/Russian and Western/NATO equipment, that completely ignore the doctrinal issues involved. This stuff is context dependent, and is hard to evaluate without knowing how it was supposed to be used. Arguably one of the biggest mistakes the Russians made in Ukraine was ignoring much of their own doctrine during the initial invasion.

I think this is a persistent issue with a lot of large military organizations, the tendency to mirror image their opponents and assume they’ll do something similar to what you would do. It can be amusing to go over Cold War vintage articles and count just how far off the analysts were (at least in public).

[jdougan]

The Chieftain talks about autoloaders, blowout panels and exploding turrets and the tradeoffs involved:

Turret Pop: The Autoloader is NOT the Problem @TheChieftainsHatch

[eggspurt]

Advanced future military laser achieves UK first

[Devereaux]

It’s funny you mention “Willie & Jo” - two of my favorite characters when I was a kid. I still have my copy of Up Front Sgt. Mike from the Navy Times is another although I don’t think anyone has published a collection of Vietnam era cartoons from him.

Interestingly, military policy was hardly Willy & Jo’s forte. Military policy is often written by old guys who haven’t heard a round fired in anger in many years. We could run through a number of tthem (F-4 Phantoms and no ACM being just ONE) but I suspect you know them already.

The part about expecting the enemy to do what you THINK they will, however, is still with us - even when shown clearly the faults in their thinking.

[eggspurt]

[CTLaw]

I think the two controversial points are 6&9.

6 does not seem to be backed by details. More just assertions that the opposite has not been proven.

9 begs the questions of where and against whom?

[johnwalker]

[Gavin]

What should the Marine leaders learn from the conflict that Kiev triggered in the Ukraine?

It seems odd that the writers focused mainly on tax-payer-supplied equipment and ignored the most obvious lesson – the importance of the guys in the front lines. That importance is clear from the solid determination of the Ukrainian marines who are being sacrificed on the banks of the Dneiper. It was also clear from Wagner’s dogged success in driving the Ukrainians out of Bakhmut.

Maybe those US Marine “leaders” are more concerned with hitting DIE targets and making the battlefield safe for transvestites than with building up the essential esprit de corps?

[civilwestman]

Do you suppose the presence of zip ties securing the main weapon to be a leading or a following indicator of some outcome?

[jdougan]

Checking into the author, Bradley McBreen, he is a retired Marine officer (at LtCol) who seems to have a long history of writing think pieces of varying quality [1]. This piece was written in August 2023 and in no way appears official. I can’t tell if he’s another Beltway Bandit, or the second coming of Col David Hackworth (the man who coined the delightful phrase “Perfumed Princes of the Pentagon”)

Looking it over, I think it is, in item 6, his response to parts of the Force Design 2030 plan (FD2030) that the last Marine Commandant put into action. One of the parts of the plan is to take away the USMC organic access to tanks, and lean more heavily into the more traditional light infantry and amphibious warfare aspects of the USMC in preparation for an upcoming Pacific war with China. In view of this, I think point 9 concerns Taipei, Seoul, Manila, etc. in the West Pacific.

I, myself, am not a huge fan of parts of FD2030. The USMC armoured up (and got it’s own aircraft and ships) independently from the Army and Navy for a number of reasons (Guadalcanal, Presidential fire brigade duties, etc.) and I really don’t see those reasons going away.

[1] https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/neb7ty/usmc_major_brendan_mcbreen_claimed_that_playing_a/
[2] Force Design 2030 - Wikipedia

[Gavin]

@jdougan

lean more heavily into the more traditional light infantry and amphibious warfare aspects of the USMC in preparation for an upcoming Pacific war with China.

What would Sun Tzu say about the Marines focusing on a plan that would take a relatively small force of light infantry at the end of a very long trans-Pacific supply line and throw it onto the beaches of the current global industrial superpower with a military manpower of millions backed by a population of about 1.4 Billion?

I guess the advice from Sun Tzu would be – Get Real! This is not like England’s military imposing its will on a backward decadent Imperial China in the Opium Wars.

[Mettelus]

I am no military strategist, but it seems to me China’s weak point is the requirement to import energy in the form of oil or coal. A boat load (no pun intended) of this energy ships through the Straight of Malacca. How long can China survive without oil imports that have to pass through this choke point?

When I look at the map below, I think there might be a lot of action in Malaysia and Philippines. Might be right up the Marines alley.

One indirect way to hurt China would be to simply let the pirates run wild in the Strait of Malacca. Similar to the Houthis being able to effectively disrupt the shipping at the choke point into the Red Sea and Suez canal.

Makes me think that the US strategy in the Ukraine was bad from multiple angles. Accelerating Russia to China energy infrastructure reduces the importance of the Strait of Malacca and thus the impact of the US Navy. Blowing up the Nord stream pipeline, makes Europe more susceptible to issues at the Red Sea choke point.

The map below is from Peter Zeihan. I have never read or listened to Peter so have no opinion of him, but I like his maps.

[CTLaw]

@Mettelus

How long can China survive without oil imports that have to pass through this choke point?

Invade Siberia.

Or sink any navy that might try to close off the straits and avoid the problem.

[Gavin]

@Mettelus

When I look at the map below, I think there might be a lot of action in Malaysia and Philippines. Might be right up the Marines alley.

The underlying assumption is that the US can make war against China in other parts of the world without suffering grave consequences. That is a very dubious assumption.

China clearly has allies and dependents in the “Global South” who would be happy to make life very difficult for the US. Those proxies could also make life even more difficult for the Europeans, and split off support for the US from that quarter. And of course if China ever feels directly threatened, the Washington DC swamp will be subject to nuclear remodeling.

But the much more likely response of China to threatening US military activity on the coasts of Asia would obviously be (a) to stop all shipments of exports to the import-dependent US, and (b) to send the US economy into chaos by dumping their large stock of US Treasuries. Those actions would cost China, but much less than the cost of an all-out war.

[eggspurt]

(sound on - tscherepata in the children’s song is turtle)

In the meantime, in Russia:

[CTLaw]

Interestingly, the Saker UAV recognition tags such as “Heavy armor” are in proper American English, not Ukrainian or Limey such as “Heavy armour”.

Saker UAV

[CTLaw]

Much of the more improvised UAV/UGV use shows an interesting aspect of this particular war. With relatively static lines, the invadee has an advantage of proximity of its civilian infrastructure. Its easier for a bunch of guys in a barn 50 miles from the front to make these things and get them to the front than for guys 500 miles from the front.