Looking for a good read? Here is a recommendation. I have an unusual approach to reviewing books. I review books I feel merit a review. Each review is an opportunity to recommend a book. If I do not think a book is worth reading, I find another book to review. You do not have to agree with everything every author has written (I do not), but the fiction I review is entertaining (and often thought-provoking) and the non-fiction contain ideas worth reading.
Book Review
A Theory of Victory
Reviewed by Mark Lardas
April 12, 2026
“Under the Shadow of Napoleon: The US Army’s Doctrine, Education, and Theory of Victory from 1814 to 1941. Second Edition,” by Michael A Bonura, University of North Texas Press, April 2026, 448 pages, $34.95 (Hardcover), $27.96 (E-book)
Since the end of the War of 1812, the United States Army fought using a unified theory of how to conduct wars and win wars. For over 120 years, from 1814 to 1941, its theory of victory came from French doctrine, used by Napoleon in his campaigns.
“Under the Shadow of Napoleon: The US Army’s Doctrine, Education, and Theory of Victory from 1814 to 1941. Second Edition,” by Michael A Bonura explores the period when the US Army drew upon a doctrine distilled during the Wars of French Revolution and perfected and practiced by Napoleon Bonaparte.
Bonura opens by introducing the French Theory of Victory. Developed during the French Revolution, it prioritized the offensive, recognizing victory was achieved by attacking. A purely defensive war was doomed to either defeat or stalemate. It emphasized nonspecialized infantry as the offensive spearhead, supported by artillery and cavalry.
This doctrine was brought to America by Winfield Scott, who first used it during the War of 1812, winning battles with it. There were several reasons it succeeded and endured. It allowed development of a heterogeneous army. Soldiers were expected to master a variety of skills, not narrowly specialize. It fostered aggressive tactics. Both fit the armies of the US.
Bonura also shows how, once installed, it remained the dominant doctrine until replaced by a newer combined arms doctrine in 1941. Bonura shows the new doctrine maintained the offensive spirit of the older doctrine even then. Both approaches avoided dogmatism, encouraging initiative by low-level officers, and battlefield innovation.
This is the second edition of this book. The first appeared fourteen years ago. This is a major revision, incorporating a number of new primary sources. Bonura also changed the book’s focus. In the first edition he looked at what he called the US Army’s Way of Warfare. In this edition, he changed the focus to the Theory of Victory. He did this to emphasize Army theory was concerned with winning wars, not simply conducting wars.
“Under the Shadow of Napoleon” is a specialized book. It is an intellectual history of the US Army. It will interest those interested in grand strategy. While it is aimed at military professionals, military historians and those interested in the “how” of military planning, readers do not need to be military experts to read and understand it. It is clearly written, its concepts accessible to anyone with an interest in the topic.
Mark Lardas, an engineer, freelance writer, historian, and model-maker, lives in League City. His website is marklardas.com.